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1 On the debate around the “new Judeophobia” see 
also the collective work of Balibar et al 2003 and 
the special issue of Revue internationale et
1. New anti-Semitism or new Judeophobia?
The increase in the number of anti-Semitic acts since the 
start of the Second Intifada has sparked off a broad debate 
on the return of anti-Semitism in France. In two recent 
works, Pierre-André Taguieff takes the view that this 
represents the birth of a “new Judeophobia” aimed exclu-
sively at Jews, unlike the old anti-Semitism that signifies 
rejection of “Semites” – both Jews and Arabs (Taguieff 
2002; 2004b).1 In his opinion, the radical novelty of this 
phenomenon lies in the mode of argument and grounds 
for accusation. Judeophobia, he says, is no longer based 
on the alleged superiority of the Aryan race as in the time 
of Nazism, but on anti-Zionism and the polemical mixing 
of “Jews,” “Israelis,” and “Zionists.” It turns the accusa-
tion of racism against the victims of yesterday, making 
Ariel Sharon a substitute Hitler and glorifying Palestin-
ians, Arabs and Muslims as the “victims” of Zionism. 
While this new Judeophobia is developing mainly in the 
Arab-Muslim world with its radical Islamist networks, it 
also affects western countries, supported by militant third 
world supporters, anti-Zionists and anti-Americans in 
the very name of anti-racist and anti-imperialist struggle. 
In short, he says that anti-Semitism is in the process of 
changing camps and of migrating from the extreme right 
to the extreme left of the political arena, to the “alter”-
globalizers, the communists, the “neo-Trotskyists” (see 
chapter “Dangereuses convergences” [Dangerous Con-
vergences] in Prêcheurs de haine [Preachers of Hatred] 
Taguieff 2004b, 819 –945). Moreover, it is said to be devel-
oping amid relative indifference, without triggering strong 
counter-mobilizations of the kind that were seen when the 
Jewish cemetery in Carpentras was desecrated in 1990.
Taguieff is interested in discourse and supports his argu-
ments with quotations from the press, from interviews 
with political leaders, from websites and from militant lit-
erature. In this article, I will focus rather on public opin-
ion, rewording the starting question as follows: Does one 
observe a rise in anti-Jewish opinions in France today? 
Do these opinions correlate or not with negative opinions 
of other minorities, notably Maghrebians and Muslims? 
Do they tend to develop among voters and sympathizers 
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of the extreme right or on the extreme left of the political 
spectrum? And how are they related to opinions concern-
ing Zionism and the Israelo-Palestinian conflict?
To evaluate the transformations in French anti-Semitism, 
I will rely on two types of data. The first is police and 
gendarmerie statistics published by the National Consul-
tative Committee on Human Rights (C NC DH), which 
is charged with presenting the prime minister with an 
annual report on the struggle against racism and xeno-
phobia in France.2 The other is data from surveys, notably 
surveys commissioned by C NC DH for its annual report 
and surveys conducted at the Center for Political Research 
(C E V I P OF) at Sciences Po (Paris Institute for Political 
Research). They show that anti-Semitic opinions follow 
a different logic from acts, that the social, cultural and 
political profile of anti-Semites remains very close to that 
of other types of racists, and that anti-Zionism and anti-
Semitism do not overlap exactly.
2. The rise in anti-Semitic acts
One does indeed note in mainland France an unprec-
edented increase in attacks on individuals thought to be 
Jews, their places of worship, their schools and their prop-
erty. This increase coincides with the start of the Second 
Intifada in the occupied territories and with the intensifi-
cation of the Israelo-Palestinian conflict. Interior ministry 
statistics list 970 incidents in 2004, of which 200 were 
acts of violence (attacks on persons or property) and 770 
were “threats” (graffiti, pamphlets, acts of intimidation). 
That is a year-on-year increase of 61% in acts and 58% in 
threats and is the highest level of anti-Semitic violence 
ever recorded by this instrument in France, with a marked 
increase in cemetery desecrations and incidents in schools. 
2 This independent committee comprises repre-
sentatives of the prime minister, of 15 ministries, 
of the National Assembly and of the Senate along 
with representatives of civil society (associations,
trade unions, universities, churches, etc.). Its func-
tion is to monitor France’s actions, both national 
and international, in the area of the defense of hu-
man rights and to advise the French government.
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Figure 1: Proportion of antisemitic acts in total of racist acts ( 1993 –2004)
Moreover, since the year 2000 anti-Semitic acts and 
threats have accounted for the majority of racist incidents 
recorded in France. From 37 % in 1999, the proportion rose 
to 82% in 2001, 51 % in 2001, 71 % in 2002, 72% in 2003 and 
62% in 2004 (Figure 1). 
In addition, the aggressors’ profile has changed. Whereas 
previously this violence was initiated almost exclusively 
by the extreme right, and continues to be so in the case 
of desecrations, since 2000 a significant proportion of 
the perpetrators identified were youths of Arab-Muslim 
immigrant origin in revolt against society and full of 
resentment toward a community that they see as more 
privileged, as investigations conducted by Michel Wievi-
orka among youths in working-class districts of Roubaix 
(Wieviorka 2005) have found. These youths are especially 
reactive to the international context, given that the peaks 
of violence correspond very closely to the start of the 
Second Intifada (September– October 2000), to 11 Sep-
tember 2001, to Operation Rampart conducted by Israel 
in the Jenin refugee camp (April 2002), to the American 
intervention in Iraq (March–April 2003) and to the Ma-
drid bombings (March 2004) (see Figure 2). As a recent 
CNCDH report underlines, “thus events in the Middle 
East have led a number of youths to identify openly with 
the Palestinian fighters who are felt to symbolize the 
brutalities of which they see themselves as the victims in 
western society” (CNCDH 2004, 51). 
3. The decline in prejudices
Still, these acts are carried out by a minority of individu-
als and analysis of surveys, notably the annual C NCDH 
surveys, shows that French public opinion in general is not 
anti-Semitic. 
3.1. Growing severity toward anti-Semitic acts
One observes no tolerance by French society of racist 
acts in general and anti-Jewish acts in particular. On the 
contrary, such acts of violence have never been so clearly 
condemned. The dominant feeling is that courts are not 
tough enough, especially when dealing with cemetery des-
ecrations and damage to places of worship (Table 1). 
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Figure 2: Effects of intrnational context on level of Anti-semitic acts ( 2000 –2004)
Attitudes as regards racist or anti-Semitic remarks are 
even more striking. In two years, the proportion of 
respondents thinking that a person who calls someone a 
“dirty Jew” or a “dirty Arab” should be condemned rose 
spectacularly, by twenty percentage points. In the former 
case (“dirty Jew”) it rose from 59% in 2002 to 81% in 2004 
and in the latter (“dirty Arab”) from 47 % to 67 %.3 This 
growing severity is explained both by the extent, gravity 
and spectacular nature of the violent acts recorded in 2004 
(serial cemetery desecrations, blade weapon attacks) and 
by the fact that they were very widely broadcast and blown 
up by the media (CNCDH 2005, 121) and condemned by all 
political leaders. The greatest call for sanctions is against 
those in charge of racist or anti-Semitic publications. 
Eighty-five percent of the sample thought that a person in 
charge of a publication that had disseminated a racist or 
anti-Semitic writing should be prosecuted by the courts. 
This figure rises to 89 % in the case of a person responsible 
for a website. If anti-Semitic acts and incitement are mul-
tiplying, public opinion is by no means indulgent toward 
them (see the detailed report, Mayer/Michelat 2005).
3.2. The decline in anti-Semitic opinions
Over the long term there has been no progression in 
hostile opinions as regards Jews. Rather, the feeling that 
they are wholly citizens has gained ground if one is to 
believe the last, very detailed investigation carried out by 
the French Association of Friends of the University of Tel 
Aviv.4 In 1946, just over one third of the adult population 
thought that a “French person of Jewish origin” was just as 
French as another French person.5 In 2005, 92% consid-
ered that a “Jewish French person” was just as French as 
another French person. In 1966, one in two French people 
said that if it depended solely on them they would avoid 
having a Jewish president of the republic. By 2005, the 
proportion had fallen to 17%.6 Memories of the Shoah 
remain vivid and one discerns no upsurge in negationism, 
as a recent survey of remembrance of the Holocaust com-
missioned by the American Jewish Committee shows.7 
The old stereotype that says “Jews have too much power,” 
is also on the wane after a brief resurgence in 1999 at the 
time of the debate around reparations for despoliation 
suffered by Jews during World War II followed by another 
in 2000 when the Second Intifada was launched (Table 2). 
This subject is not insignificant. It fits into a system of 
anti-Semitic attitudes, because those who agree with this 
stereotype also think that Jews are “too numerous” and 
that they are not “French people like others,” would avoid 
having a Jewish president, etc. One can see in this a toned-
down version of the myth of the occult influence of Jews, 
a vehicle for which in the past was the Protocols of the El-
ders of Zion, a celebrated forgery produced by the Tsarist 
police (see Taguieff 2004 a). Overall, however, during the 
period covered by our surveys the two most striking facts 
are the decrease (from 27 % to 17 %) in the rate of refusals 
to answer the question, an indication of the polarization 
Table 1: Opinions on the severity of courts in dealing with racism 
and anti-Semitism in 2004 (%)
And, in your opinion, are the sentences currently handed down 
by French courts not harsh enough, too harsh or just right?”
Not harsh 
enough
Grave desecrations and damage to cemeteries 72
Damage to a place of worship such as a synagogue [Split A]* 64
Damage to a place of worship such as a mosque [Split B]* 62
Public pronouncements of a xenophobic, racist  
or anti-Semitic nature 60
An attack of an anti-Semitic nature on a person [Split A]* 57
An attack of an anti-Maghrebian nature on a person [Split B]* 57
Insults of a racist nature 56
Acts which they [the courts] have to judge 54
BVA /CNCDH poll conducted from 22 to 24 November 2004 of a nationwide sample of 
1,036 persons representative of the population living in France and aged 18 or over.
*  Split : Half of the sample was asked question A and the other half question B, at random.
3 Split sample technique. At random, the question 
is put to half of the sample in respect of Jews and to 
the other half in respect of Arabs. The 2004 sample 
was split into thirds with a further question about 
terms such as “dirty queer”. 
4 IFOP (Institut français d’opinion publique) poll, 
the first wave was conducted face to face on May 3
and 4, 2005 with a nationwide representative sample 
of the population aged 18 and above (N = 1000). 
5 IFOP poll for CR IF (Representative Council of 
Jewish Institutions in France), February 13 –20, 1946 
(N = 1132). 
6 IFOP poll for Nouvel Adam.
7 T NS -SOFR ES poll was conducted on May 3–4 
and 11–12, 2005 with nationwide representative 
samples of the population aged 18 and (N = 1000), 
face to face, in France, Germany, Austria, Poland, 
Sweden, the US and the UK. On the evolution of 
negationist attitudes in France see also Duhamel 
1999.
of views on the subject, and a growing rejection of the anti-
Semitic stereotype. During the same period the proportion 
of respondents who said they “tended not” to agree or did 
“not agree at all” with it rose from 52% to 67 % (Table 2).
4. Similarity of the profile of anti-Semites and racists
If it has not gained ground, has anti-Semitism nonethe-
less changed in nature? Does it now, as Taguieff suggests, 
sport the colors of antiracism and anticolonialism? Is it 
more pronounced on the left and the extreme left? This is 
not the case, either. For example, adherence to the ste-
reotype of Jewish power is coupled with a negative image 
of Islam and of immigrants, belief that certain races are 
superior to others, acceptance of discrimination against 
black people and Maghrebians, etc. Anti-Semitism, as all 
works on racism regularly show, fits into a more general 
attitude of “ethnocentrism” in the sense of over-valuation 
of ones own group and rejection of difference, whether 
ethnic, religious or cultural.8 Those who think Jews have 
too much power do not like Arabs or Muslims either, and 
anti-Semitic prejudices develop in the same milieus as 
racist prejudices, that is among poorly educated people 
in a situation of economic insecurity and social inferior-
ity who make minorities the scapegoat for their problems. 
Thus adherence to the stereotype of Jewish power is most 
pronounced among blue-collar workers and among the 
lower middle class (small farmers, small shopkeepers 
and artisans which form the majority of the “Employ-
ers” group), among people without qualifications and the 
unemployed, regardless of the period taken into consider-
ation (Table 3). Finally, as regards politics, if these preju-
dices are found at all in the political spectrum, they are 
always more developed on the right than on the left, where 
there is more support for egalitarian, universal values. 
Now as always it is on the extreme right and not the ex-
treme left that one finds more anti-Semites, among people 
close to the FN (Front National) and people who voted for 
Jean-Marie Le Pen (Table 3). Moreover, between 1988 and 
2002 the biggest increase in the proportion of anti-Semites 
was not on the left, but on the right.
5. Anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism
To what extent does the Israelo-Palestinian conflict influ-
ence the perception of Jews in France? How are anti-Zi-
onism and anti-Semitism articulated? In the Middle East 
conflict, French public opinion is increasingly pro-Pal-
estinian. In November 2004, French people said that 
in general they had “more sympathy” for the positions 
of the latter than for those of the Israelis (34% and 13% 
of responses respectively). The head of the Palestinian 
Table 2: Adherence to the stereotype “Jews have too much power in France“ ( % )
1988 1991 1999 2000 2002/1 2002/2 2003 2005
Fully agree 9 10 10 11 8 9 9 4
Tend to agree 12 11 21 23 16 15 14 12
Total in agreement 21 21 31 34 24 25 23 16
Tend not to agree 19 16 30 30 33 32 27 23
Do not agree at all 33 33 27 25 28 34 33 44
Total not in agreement 52 49 56 54 61 66 60 67
Not response 27 30 13 12 15 9 17 17
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Surveys by CEVIPOF (Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po) / Sofres (Société française d’études par sondages), May 9 –20, 1988 (N = 4032), surveys by OIP (Observatoire interrégional 
du politique), June 17 – July 3, 1991 (N = 16216), Louis Harris / CNCDH, Nov. 17– 24, 1999 and Nov. 12–14, 2000 (N = 1000), French Electoral Panel 2002 wave 1 (April 8 – 20) and wave 2 
(May 15– 31) (N = 4107 and 4017), CEVIPOF / BVA survey on secularity, Nov. 2003 (N = 1524) and Sofres / French Association of Friends of the University of Tel Aviv survey, wave 1 (N = 1000), 
May 3 –4, 2005.
8 On the correlation between indicators of racism 
and of anti-Semitism see especially Mayer 1990, 
Mayer 2003 and Mayer and Roux 2004.
Authority, now deceased, was seen as a “national resistance 
hero” rather than as “the head of a terrorist movement” 
(43% as opposed to 27 % of responses). Moreover, since the 
start of the Second Intifada the proportion of sympathisers 
with the Palestinian cause has nearly doubled, from 18% in 
October 2000 to 34% November 2004, while sympathy for 
the Israelis has remained stable at around 13–14%.9 
Nonetheless, opinions concerning Israeli and its leaders 
do not tally exactly with opinions concerning French Jews. 
One sees this first from the French Electoral Panel 2002, 
a three-phase investigation initially designed to study 
electoral change and realignment in the four rounds of the 
2002 presidential and parliamentary elections. It captures 
the “earthquake” triggered on 21 April by the elimina-
tion of the socialist candidate in favour of Jean-Marie Le 
Pen until the crushing victory of the right in the general 
election (see the first results in Cautrès/Mayer 2004). The 
second wave, conducted on the day after the second round 
of the presidential election and soon after Israeli troops 
moved into Jenin, also includes a question about people’s 
liking four heads of state, among them Yasser Arafat and 
Ariel Sharon,10 and a question on the stereotype “Jews have 
too much power in France.” Neither of the two leaders 
really aroused people’s liking. Ariel Sharon scored 3.2 out 
of ten and Yasser Arafat 3.7, markedly less than George 
Bush (4.5) and Tony Blair (5.7). However, contrary to 
what one might have expected, there is no relation be-
tween the feelings expressed for Arafat and for Sharon.11 
While anti-Semitism varies in an inverse proportion to 
the liking expressed for the Israeli prime minister, even 
among people who are most hostile to him12 a clear ma-
jority rejects the anti-Semitic stereotype (60 % reject and 
Table 3: Adherence to the stereotype “Jews have too much power in 
France“ by social and political profile (%)
1988 2002
Total 21 25
Sex
Male 24 27
Female 20 22
Age
18 –24 11 12
25 – 34 16 14
35 – 49 19 20
50 – 64 27 30
65 and over 33 40
Qualification
Primary 30 39
Higher primary 20 27
Baccalauréat 11 20
Bac +2 11 19
Higher education 10 11
Individual profession
Farmer 26 38
Employer 25 35
Senior executive 15 21
Member of a profession 18 20
White-collar worker 21 26
Blue-collar worker 29 30
Vote cast in presidential election first round 2002
Extreme Left 21 18
Left 20 18
Right 20 24
Extreme right 37 37
Party proximity
Extreme Left 19 18
Communist party 27 22
Socialist party 20 18
UDF (Union pour la démocratie franc¸aise) 19 20
RPR (Rassemblement pour la république) 25 28
Front national 40 40
CEVIPOF post-electoral survey, May 9–20, 1988 (N = 4032) and  
French Electoral Panel, May 15–31, 2002, second wave (N = 4017).
9 Polls conducted by the BVA (Brulé Ville Associé) institute of nationwide
representative samples of the French population aged 18 and over (N = 1000). 
For the details of this evolution, see Mayer 2005, 143–144. 
10 “What degree of liking do you feel for each of the following foreign person-
alities as measured with this thermometer on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 corre-
sponds to a strong dislike and 10 to a strong liking)?” Scores were calculated 
from the proportion of respondents. The proportion refusing to respond 
amounted to 4%, 1 %, 2% and 2%. For a detailed presentation see Mayer 2004. 
11 Pearson r of – .03 insignificant on the threshold of .01. 
12 In each case the sample was split into thirds, by the growing level of sympa-
thy for Sharon (score 1 /2–4 /5 and more), Arafat (scores 1–2 /3–4 /5 and more) 
and Bush (scores 1–2 / 3–4 /5 and more). 
32% approve it in the group which feels most antipathy 
toward Sharon, as against 71 % and 20 % respectively in 
the group that like him most). At the same time, the 
proportion of anti-Semites is higher among anti-Ara-
fat than among pro-Arafat respondents (28 % and 24% 
respectively of adherence to the stereotype concern-
ing the power of Jews). If one crosses the popularity of 
the two leaders with adherence to that same stereotype 
(Table 4) one sees that those who like neither Sharon nor 
Arafat manifest an equally high level of anti-Semitism to 
those who like Arafat and hate Sharon (32%), while the 
least anti-Semitic are those who score highest on the two 
scales of liking (18 % agree). 
A recent survey conducted in parallel of the French popu-
lation of voting age and a representative sample of French 
people of African and Turkish immigrant origin of the 
same age group (Brouard/Tiberj 2005)13 crossed classic 
indicators of anti-Semitism (“Jews have too much power,” 
“There is too much talk about the extermination of Jews 
during the Second World War,” “For French Jews, Israel 
matters more than France”) with questions on positive or 
negative perception of Israel and its responsibility in the 
Middle East conflict. While the level of anti-Semitism is 
10 to 15 points higher among French people of immigrant 
origin and correlates to the degree to which they are prac-
tising Muslims, the level of negative attitudes toward Israel 
is the same in both groups (Table 5).
Analysis of the correlations between the answers to these 
various questions, if one confines oneself to the control 
sample, confirms that opinions concerning the Jews of 
France on the one hand and the conflict between Israelis 
and Palestinians on the other do not totally overlap (Ta-
ble 6). Those who judge that “Jews have too much power” 
also think that there is too much talk about the Shoah and 
that for French Jews Israel matters more than France (cor-
relations of .338 and .346 respectively, upper left quadrand). 
There is a much lower correlation between these three 
questions and a negative perception of Israel (.155, .137 and 
.102), and no correlation at all between them and the feeling 
that Israel bears most responsibility in the conflict, a feel-
ing associated, on the other hand, with a negative image 
of that country (.215) (lower left quadrant). People may 
criticize Israel and condemn its policy toward the Pales-
tinians without holding the Jews of France responsible 
and without necessarily being “anti-Semitic” in the classic 
sense of the term. Only in the sample of French people 
of African and Turkish immigrant origin, the majority of 
them Muslims, anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism seem to 
be more closely matched. The correlations between the 
Table 4: Adherence to the stereotype “Jews have too much power 
in France” by the degree of liking for Arafat and Sharon (%)
Degree of liking for Sharon Degree of liking for Arafat
Low Moderate High
Low 32
(498)
29
(245)
32
(565)
Moderate 28
(456)
19
(499)
22
(388)
High 24
(405)
19
(300)
18
(477)
Source: French Electoral Panel 2002, second wave. The figures in parentheses are  
the numbers on the basis of which the percentages of cases were calculated.
Table 5: Opinions concerning Jews and Israel (%)
French people of 
immigrant origin
French 
population
There is too much talk about the exter-
mination of Jews (agree completely/
trend to agree) 50 35
Jews have too much power in France 
(agree completely/ trend to agree) 39 20
For French Jews, Israel matters more 
than France (agree completely/ trend 
to agree) 52 45
Israel (evokes something rather 
negative) 49 51
Israelis bear most responsibility in 
the Israelo-Palestinian conflict 28
(1003)
13
(1006)
CEVIPOF/TNS-SOFRES survey April—May 2005, relation to politics of French people  
of immigrant origin.
13 This telephone survey, the first of its kind, was 
conducted at CEVIPOF by Sylvain Brouard and 
Vincent Tiberj and run by TNS-SOFRES (Société 
française d’études par sondages) from April 8
to May 7, 2005 with a nationwide representative 
sample of 1,003 French people aged 18 or over of 
African or Turkish immigrant origin (immigrants 
themselves or with at least one immigrant parent
 or grandparent), compared with a control sample 
of 1,006 French people of voting age (April 8 – May 
16, 2005).
Table 6: Correlations between opinions concerning Jews and Israel
Items relating to Jews Items relating to Israel
There is too much talk 
about the extermina-
tion of Jews during 
World War II
Jews have too much 
power in France
For French Jews, Israel 
matters more than France
Israel evokes some-
thing rather negative
Israel bears most 
responsibility in 
the conflict
French population
Items relating to Jews
There is too much 
talk about the ex-
termination of Jews 
during World War II
Jews have too much 
power in France .338**
For French Jews, 
Israel matters more 
than France .159** .346**
Items relating to Israel
Israel evokes some-
thing rather negative .155** .137** .102**
Israel bears most 
responsibility in 
the conflict .075* .072* .031 .215**
French of immigrant origin
Items relating to Jews
There is too much 
talk about the ex-
termination of Jews 
during World War II
Jews have too much 
power in France .297**
For French Jews, 
Israel matters more 
than France .150** .265**
Items relating to Israel
Israel evokes some-
thing rather negative .095** .218** .113**
Israel bears most 
responsibility in 
the conflict .071* .145** .169** .306**
Pearson r significant on the threshold of .01 (** ) or 0.5 (*)
two questions about the perception of French Jews and the 
two questions about the image of Israel (lower left quad-
rant) are higher than in the control group (.218 versus .137, 
.145 versus .072, .113 versus .102 and .169 versus .031).
6. Conclusion
Of course, opinion polls have their limits. More detailed 
questions on the perception of Zionism, of Israel and of 
its policies, and other techniques (non-directive inter-
views, projective tests, participant observation) would be 
required to analyse in depth the affective repercussions 
in France of the Israelo-Palestinian conflict and to take 
account of the multiple ways there are of living as a Jew, 
Arab, Muslim, Catholic or atheist. For all their weak-
nesses, the surveys commissioned nonetheless show that 
despite the deterioration in Israel’s image and despite the 
multiplication of acts of violence against Jewish French 
people, their schools and their synagogues, anti-Semitism 
in the classical sense of prejudice against Jews is not gain-
ing ground, but rather the contrary. Moreover, its nature 
does not seem to have changed fundamentally. It primar-
ily affects the same milieus as previously, milieus that are 
socially and culturally disadvantaged, and it is more fre-
quently found on the extreme right than on the extreme 
left of the political arena. “New” Judeophobia is still very 
much like the old kind.
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